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WHEN IMMIGRANTS SPEAK: THE 
PRECARIOUS STATUS OF NON-CITIZEN 
SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
MICHAEL KAGAN* 
Abstract: Although many unauthorized immigrants have become politically 
active in campaigning for immigration reform, their ability to speak out pub-
licly may depend more on political discretion than on the constitutional pro-
tections that citizens normally take for granted. Potential threats to immigrant 
free speech may be seen in three areas of law. First, the Department of Justice 
has made a broad claim that immigrants who have not been legally admitted 
to the country have no First Amendment protection at all. Second, the Su-
preme Court has approved broad prohibitions on non-citizens spending money 
on speech that is related to electoral campaigns. Third, the Court has indicated 
that the federal government might, in its discretion, act to deport immigrants 
because of their political activities. The Supreme Court should revisit these 
questions because current case law is in tension with other principles of free 
speech law, especially the prohibition on identity-based speech restrictions as 
articulated in Citizens United v. FEC. As the Court explained, the First 
Amendment protects the rights of marginalized people to have a voice and 
does not allow the government to prefer some speakers over others based on 
their identity. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the 2016 presidential campaign, nearly every candidate had some-
thing to say about immigrants. What if immigrants join these debates and 
speak for themselves? Do they have a constitutional right to participate in 
American political discourse, or may they do so only by the grace of those 
in power? Although the First Amendment clearly protects the right of citi-
zens to talk about immigrants, free speech jurisprudence is less clear about 
whether immigrants may speak up on their own behalf. This article high-
lights the fact that immigrants’ freedom of speech is on insecure legal 
ground, in large part because the Supreme Court has sent contradictory sig-
nals about it. If the White House were to be occupied by a president who is 
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hostile to immigrants and intolerant of dissent, immigrant activists could 
not be confident that the courts would protect their expressive liberty. 
The proposition that immigrant freedom of speech is in doubt may be 
surprising given the surge in public political activism by immigrants in re-
cent years. Many of these activists make their unlawful presence in the 
United States a central part of their message. The campaign for the Dream 
Act mobilized unauthorized immigrants who were brought to the country as 
children.1 In a nationally televised address, President Obama highlighted 
the story of Astrid Silva, a Nevada-based activist who, in the President’s 
words, came to the United States with nothing more than “a cross, her doll, 
and the frilly dress she had on” and who now has multiple university de-
grees.2 Ms. Silva later spoke in support of Hillary Clinton at the 2016 Dem-
ocratic National Convention (“DNC”) while other unauthorized immigrants 
were given other roles at the DNC.3 A Google image search for “immigrant 
activism” finds photographs of protesters holding up signs identifying 
themselves as “undocumented, unafraid.” One protest initiative called the 
“No Papers, No Fear Ride for Justice” organized a tour of immigrant activ-
ists on an “UndocuBus.”4 There are bloggers who speak openly about their 
immigration situation and advise others in similar predicaments about how 
to pursue educational and career opportunities.5 A Pulitzer Prize winning 
journalist, Jose Antonio Vargas, produced a film for CNN called Document-
ed: A Film By An Undocumented American.6 On the surface, it certainly 
seems that even unlawfully present immigrants feel that they can talk freely 
about their situations and add their voice to the national debate about immi-
gration policy. 
Yet, although such activism has blossomed, the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) has argued in federal court that non-citizens who were not legally 
admitted to the country have no claim to protection under the First Amend-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See, e.g., About Us, UNITED WE DREAM, http://unitedwedream.org/about/our-missions-
goals/.[https://perma.cc/6KWX-5U7E]. 
 2 Amanda Sakuma, Astrid Silva: Obama Lifts One Immigrant’s Story Out of the Shadows, 
MSNBC.COM (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/obama-lifts-one-immigrants-story-out-
the-shadows#55174 [https://perma.cc/M3C6-7FAT]. 
 3 See Alexander S Corey, Nevada Immigration Reform Advocate to Speak at Democratic 
Convention, LAS VEGAS REV. J. (July 15, 2016), http://www.reviewjournal.com/politics/election-
2016/nevada-immigration-reform-advocate-speak-democratic-convention; Undocumented Immi-
grants Given Roles at Democratic Convention, FOXBUSINESS, (July 22, 2016), http://www.fox
business.com/politics/2016/07/22/undocumented-immigrants-given-roles-at-democratic-convention.
html. 
 4 NO PAPERS, NO FEAR RIDE FOR JUSTICE, http://nopapersnofear.org/index.php [https://perma.
cc/E2DP-U6RD]. 
 5 See MY (UN)DOCUMENTED LIFE, http://mydocumentedlife.org [https://perma.cc/V9GV-
P6BS]. 
 6 See DOCUMENTED: A FILM BY AN UNDOCUMENTED AMERICAN (CNN Films 2013). 
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ment.7 The Supreme Court affirmed a decision holding that federal election 
law may prohibit immigrants from making even small expenditures to speak 
for or against candidates in an election.8 The Supreme Court has also af-
firmed the power of the federal government to single out certain immigrants 
for deportation for political activities that would have qualified as protected 
speech but for their immigration status.9 It may be that immigrant activism 
has flourished in recent years not because the activists had a clear legal 
right to speak but because the Obama Administration has chosen not to try 
to silence them. A future president may be able to use this discretion very 
differently. Although current law is somewhat more protective of free ex-
pression for legal permanent residents than for other non-citizens in the 
United States, it is not currently clear whether this is a matter of constitu-
tional law or merely a statutory choice that Congress could opt to revoke.10 
In March 2016, an Egyptian student legally in the United States was 
forced to leave the country after a social media outburst against presidential 
candidate Donald Trump, highlighting how immigrant speech is uniquely 
vulnerable to suppression.11 The student, Emadeldin Elsayed, wrote on his 
Facebook page: “I literally don’t mind taking a lifetime sentence in jail for 
killing this guy, I would actually be doing the whole world a favor.”12 He 
told the Associated Press, “It’s just a stupid post. . . . I don’t know why 
would they [sic] think I am a threat to the national security of the United 
States just because of a stupid post.”13 Indeed, Elsayed’s Facebook post is 
the kind of vehement political statement that the Supreme Court has previ-
ously held to be protected free speech so long as there is no real threat of 
actual violence.14 The government declined to pursue criminal charges 
                                                                                                                           
 7 See Federal Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Re-
straining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 11–13, Pineda-Cruz v. Thompson, No. SA-15-CV-326-
XR (W.D. Tex. May 7, 2015), 2015 WL 3922298; see also infra notes 30–96 and accompanying text. 
 8 Bluman v. FEC, 132 S. Ct. 1087, 1087 (Mem) (2012); see infra notes 97–148 and accompany-
ing text. 
 9 U.S. ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904); see infra notes 149–204 and accom-
panying text. 
 10 See Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 283, 284 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 132 S.Ct. 1087 
(Mem) (2012). 
 11 See Take Two, Can Immigrants Threaten a Presidential Candidate? 89.3 KPCC (Mar. 9, 
2016), http://www.scpr.org/programs/take-two/2016/03/09/47060/can-immigrants-threaten-
a-presidential-candidate/ [https://perma.cc/9YNR-THFT]; ASSOCIATED PRESS, Egyptian Student in 
Hot Water After Posting Trump Threat, CBSNEWS (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/
donald-trump-threat-egypt-student-facebook-deportation-us-election-2016/ [https://perma.cc/883S-
DRXU]. 
 12 Take Two, supra note 11. 
 13 ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 11. 
 14 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706, 708 (1969) (overturning a conviction of a Vi-
etnam-era anti-draft demonstrator who said, “If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to 
get in my sights is L.B.J.” because the statement was a form of “political hyperbole” and because the 
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against Elsayed.15 Moreover, around the same time, Trump himself had 
made a number of verbal threats of violence against protesters at his rallies, 
and some actual violence had taken place without any criminal charges filed 
against Trump for his statements.16 Yet, because Elsayed was in the United 
States as a non-citizen on a temporary visa, he was vulnerable to govern-
ment action triggered by his speech in a way that a citizen would not have 
been. 
To be clear, there are some Supreme Court decisions that say that im-
migrants are protected under the First Amendment. Additionally, there are 
good arguments that could be used to combat an aggressive attempt by the 
government to repress immigrant speech. The case law is conflicted, limited 
in scope, and, in some important ways, simply unclear about how far the 
government can go. If it chose, the federal government could use this ambi-
guity to try to control immigrant dissent. This article’s first goal is to illu-
minate this muddle and to highlight the specific ways in which current law 
makes immigrants vulnerable to a kind of political repression that the Con-
stitution presumably forbids. The second goal is to illustrate arguments 
drawn from the Supreme Court’s case law that should be used to clarify that 
all people in the United States have freedom of speech, regardless of their 
immigration status. 
Perhaps surprisingly, one of the most promising arguments to this ef-
fect comes from the 2010 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. 
FEC.17 In that case, the Court held that it offends the First Amendment for 
the government to restrict speech based on the identity of the speaker.18 Jus-
tice Kennedy’s majority opinion explained better than any other Supreme 
Court decision why it is essential to prevent the government from silencing 
people based on who they are.19 Unfortunately, the liberal justices on the 
Court have not been willing to embrace this idea whereas the conservative 
                                                                                                                           
First Amendment protects speech that may be “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp 
attacks on government and public officials”) (internal quotation omitted). 
 15 ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 11. 
 16 See Ben Schreckinger, Trump Cracks Down on Protesters, POLITICO (Mar. 7, 2016), http://
www.politico.com/story/2016/03/donald-trump-rally-protester-crack-down-220407 [https://perma.cc/
HG2T-KKES]; Aaron Katersky & Tom Liddy, Trump Won’t Face Inciting a Riot Charges for North 
Carolina Rally, Sheriff’s Office Says, GOOD MORNING AMERICA (Mar. 15, 2016), https://gma.yahoo.
com/trump-wont-face-inciting-riot-charges-north-carolina-062957255—abc-news-topstories.html 
[https://perma.cc/PEX2-T7AZ]; Jeremy Diamond, Donald Trump on Protester: “I’d Like to Punch 
Him in the Face,” CNN (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/23/politics/donald-trump-
nevada-rally-punch/index.html [https://perma.cc/XE6M-7ME5]. 
 17 See also infra notes 217–254 and accompanying text. See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 
558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that governmental restrictions on campaign financing is a violation 
of the First Amendment).  
 18 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340–41. 
 19 See id.; infra notes 217–254 and accompanying text. 
2016] Non-Citizen Speech Under the First Amendment 1241 
justices have so far declined to apply it in other cases. As a result, both the 
conservative and liberal justices bear responsibility for leaving immigrant 
free speech insecure. In fact, the four liberal dissenters from Citizens United 
argued explicitly that the government should be able to selectively repress 
speech by non-citizens in the United States.20 This article argues that critics 
of Citizens United who fear the corruptive role of money in election cam-
paigns should nevertheless embrace the speaker discrimination doctrine that 
it announced; this is an ultimately progressive principle that fills a gap in 
free speech doctrine – a gap that has left immigrants particularly vulnera-
ble.21 Meanwhile, the justices who voted for the Citizens United decision 
need to show that this principle is broadly applicable not only in cases in-
volving well-financed independent political campaigns, or they will risk 
eroding the integrity of their reasoning in this controversial decision. 
With respect to terminology, this article often refers to any non-citizen 
in the United States as an “immigrant.” This corresponds to the way the 
public and the media tend to talk about immigrants and immigration policy, 
but it is admittedly not the technically correct terminology. For immigration 
law specialists, the term “immigrant” is a term of art that does not include 
people who arrive on a temporary visa basis.22 Those who arrive on a tem-
porary visa—which may last just a few months for a tourist or years for stu-
dents and temporary workers—are thus not immigrants within the statutory 
language.23 There are also roughly 11 million non-citizens who are unlaw-
fully present in the country, some of whom were never lawfully admitted 
because they entered without inspection and some of whom overstayed their 
visas.24 At a technical level, the most correct term for the people considered 
in this article would be “non-citizens in the United States.” The technical 
distinctions among different types of non-citizens, however, reflect statutory 
categories established by Congress more than people’s actual intentions and 
social contexts. For example, a legal permanent resident might come to the 
United States and stay only briefly, whereas an unauthorized immigrant 
might arrive illegally and stay permanently. Therefore, this article loosely 
refers to all non-citizens in the United States as immigrants and will specify 
sub-categories of this group as needed. 
The article begins by highlighting three areas of law that illustrate the 
unsettled nature of immigrant free speech rights. Part I examines the argu-
                                                                                                                           
 20 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 420. 
 21 See infra notes 217–254 and accompanying text. 
 22 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2012) (defining the term immigrant to include “every alien except” 
those within specified temporary visa categories). 
 23 See id. (establishing, among other things, temporary visa categories for visitors for business or 
pleasure, students, and temporary workers of various types). 
 24 See infra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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ment advanced by the DOJ that many immigrants simply cannot claim pro-
tection of the First Amendment because they are not part of “the people” for 
purposes of the Bill of Rights.25 Next, Part II examines current election law 
that prohibits election-related expenditures by many immigrants even to the 
extent of banning them from printing flyers to hand out in a public park.26 
Part III describes the federal government’s power to use selective enforce-
ment of immigration law to deport people because of their political activi-
ties.27 After having highlighted these problematic areas of law, Part IV de-
scribes the potential implications of the speaker discrimination principle 
that the Court articulated in Citizens United.28 Part V discusses how the 
Court should reconcile freedom of speech with the government’s plenary 
power over immigration enforcement.29 
I. THE BROAD CLAIM: CAN NON-ADMITTED IMMIGRANTS CLAIM FIRST 
AMENDMENT PROTECTION AT ALL? 
The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment applies to non-
citizens.30 A close reading of the cases where the Court has made this state-
ment, however, raises questions about how deeply the Court has considered 
the issue. Most problematic, the cases where the Court has dealt with the 
immigrant free speech issue have involved only immigrants who were in 
the country legally. In 1945, in Bridges v. Wixon—a case involving a legal 
resident—the Supreme Court said, “Freedom of speech and of press is ac-
corded aliens residing in this country.”31 In 1953, in Kwong Hai Chew v. 
Colding, the Court, in a footnote, said that neither the First nor Fifth 
Amendment distinguishes between citizens and “resident aliens.”32 In nei-
ther case did the Court suggest in any way that the First Amendment should 
not extend to unlawfully present immigrants, but the fact that it never di-
rectly addressed that question could, and indeed has, raised doubts.33 
The limited nature of the Supreme Court’s engagement with immigrant 
free speech can be seen clearly in the Bridges decision. This case concerned 
Harry Bridges, an Australian who entered and lived in the United States 
                                                                                                                           
 25 See infra notes 30–96 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 97–148 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 149–204 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 205–254 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 255–285 and accompanying text. 
 30 See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (holding that a non-citizen who published 
communist literature was protected by First Amendment). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 597 n.5 (1953). 
 33 Cf. United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 441–42 (5th Cir. 2011) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court decision that struck down a measure that discriminated against immigrants only ap-
plied to lawful immigrants). 
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legally from 1920 to 1938, at which time the government sought to deport 
him because of his previous affiliation with the Communist Party.34 The 
government alleged that Bridges had advocated the violent overthrow of the 
U.S. government.35 The foundation for this accusation, however, was that 
Bridges had been active in trade unions, including leading strikes by long-
shoremen and sponsoring the publication of a newsletter called the Water-
front Worker.36 Most of the decision is devoted to a factual analysis of 
Bridges’s activities and discussion over what Congress meant by “affilia-
tion” with the Communist Party.37 The core of the decision was the Court’s 
conclusion that there was no evidence that the Waterfront Worker had actu-
ally advocated government overthrow.38 As a result of this analysis, the 
Court decided that “we have little more than a course of conduct which re-
veals cooperation with Communist groups for the attainment of wholly law-
ful objectives.”39 
Whereas most of the decision in Bridges focused on the factual and 
statutory question, the Court addressed freedom of speech in a few sentenc-
es as part of its reasoning that “affiliation” with the Communist Party 
should not be defined broadly: 
We cannot assume that Congress meant to employ the term ‘affil-
iation’ in a broad, fluid sense which would visit such hardship on 
an alien for slight or insubstantial reasons . . . . [W]e cannot be-
lieve that Congress intended to cast so wide a net as to reach 
those whose ideas and program, though coinciding with the legit-
imate aims of such groups, nevertheless fell far short of over-
throwing the government by force and violence. Freedom of 
speech and of press is accorded aliens residing in this country. So 
far as this record shows the literature published by Harry Bridges, 
the utterances made by him were entitled to that protection. They 
revealed a militant advocacy of the cause of trade-unionism. But 
they did not teach or advocate or advise the subversive conduct 
condemned by the statute.40 
This passage shows that the Court in Bridges used free speech princi-
ples as a tool of statutory interpretation but did not consider the free speech 
issue in depth. Bridges appears to be a case of constitutional avoidance, al-
                                                                                                                           
 34 Bridges, 326 U.S. at 137–38. 
 35 Id. at 138. 
 36 Id. at 141, 146. 
 37 See id. at 141–47. 
 38 Id. at 146. 
 39 Id. at 145. 
 40 Bridges, 326 U.S. at 147–48 (internal citations omitted). 
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beit before the Court had adopted that precise terminology.41 The doctrine 
of constitutional avoidance only required the Court to find the potential for 
a constitutional problem and then interpret the statute as to minimize the 
problem.42 This prevented the Court from saying more about how and why 
free speech is accorded to immigrants. Had the Court given more explana-
tion, whether this principle applies to all immigrants or only to some could 
be better concluded, but the Court successfully avoided constitutional adju-
dication in Bridges.43 
The DOJ addressed the ambiguity about whether the Court’s limited 
statement in Bridges extends to immigrants who are in the country unlaw-
fully in April 2015 in Pineda-Cruz v. Thompson in the District Court for the 
Western District of Texas.44 In this class action lawsuit, which alleged that 
the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) had violated the free speech 
rights of immigration detainees, the DOJ told a district court: 
[A]s non-resident aliens who have not gained admission or entry 
to the United States–and have not established any connections to 
the United States–Plaintiffs are not entitled to prevail in a lawsuit 
challenging violations of the Constitutional protections of the 
First Amendment. It is well settled that certain aliens are not enti-
tled to challenge violations of Constitutional rights and privileges 
that might be actionable if challenged by American citizens.45 
Admission to the United States is “lawful entry” after inspection and 
authorization by an immigration officer.46 Thus, the DOJ argued that the 
                                                                                                                           
 41 See generally Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise 
serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such 
a construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”). 
 42 Id. 
 43 See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (“AADC”), 525 U.S. 471, 497 (1999)  
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Bridges, 326 U.S. at 148) (“It is well settled that ‘[f]reedom of 
speech and of press is accorded aliens residing in this country.”). AADC also involved immigrants who 
were in the country legally, some on temporary visas and some as permanent residents. Id. at 474. 
 44 See Federal Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 7, at 11–13; Michael Kagan, Do Immi-
grants Have Freedom of Speech?, 6 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 84, 84 & n.1 (2015), http://www.californialaw
review.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/KAGAN_84.pdf. 
 45 Federal Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 7, at 11–13. 
 46 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (2012). In its brief, the DOJ did not clarify how much of its argument 
depended on lack of legal admission versus lack of lawful presence or alternatively, lack of connec-
tions to the United States. These are overlapping but distinct concepts. Some non-citizens who are 
unlawfully present were nevertheless legally admitted, for instance, if they overstayed a tourist visa. If 
the main issue is a lack of connections to the United States, an obvious question would arise about how 
long someone must remain in the United States before acquiring First Amendment rights. If the DOJ 
intended only to argue that recent arrivals lack First Amendment protection, it did not make this clear 
in its brief. The brief discusses the duration of residency in the United States as only a secondary fac-
tor. 
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roughly 6.8 million immigrants who entered the country without inspection 
and who remain here unlawfully have no protection under the First 
Amendment.47 Taken literally, this startling suggestion appears to mean that 
millions of people not only have no claim to freedom of speech but also no 
freedom of religion as protected by the First Amendment. 
Although Pineda-Cruz was resolved without the court ruling on the 
First Amendment question, the fact that the government argued that so 
many immigrants simply cannot state a claim for relief based on the First 
Amendment is a notable sign that immigrant free speech rights are not con-
stitutionally secure.48 The DOJ’s claim does not mean that the government 
is right. This article will argue that anyone in the United States may claim 
constitutional protection of free speech. However, the fact that the DOJ 
made this argument highlights the reality that this is not a settled question—
especially because the government could point to case law that seemingly 
supported its position.49 
The DOJ argument depends on whether having connections to “the 
people” is a prerequisite for claiming protection under the First Amend-
ment. Some rights in the Constitution are explicitly limited to “the peo-
ple.”50 If free speech is limited in this way, some immigrants are certainly 
excluded because some sub-groups of immigrants do not have as strong 
connections to the country as others. In the Supreme Court’s 1990 decision 
in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court said: 
“[T]he people” protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the 
First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers 
are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class 
                                                                                                                           
 47 In 2012, the DHS estimated that 11.4 million people were in the United States without authori-
zation. See Bryan Baker & Nancy Rytina, OFF. OF IMMIGR. STAT., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTI-
MATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JAN. 
2012, at 1 (2013), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_ill_pe_2012_2.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LQ5Q-WEEU]. This includes many people who were admitted and who overstayed their 
visas. The portion of the unauthorized population that entered legally and overstayed a temporary visa 
is estimated at forty percent. See Sara Murray, Many in U.S. Illegally Overstayed Their Visas, WALL 
STREET J. (Apr. 7, 2013, 8:19 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323916304578
404960101110032 [https://perma.cc/JQ3F-MQC5]. Thus, the estimate of unlawfully present immi-
grants who were not admitted would be 6.8 million. 
 48 The DOJ offered the First Amendment argument in the alternative. Even assuming the First 
Amendment applied, the government successfully argued that detainees’ free speech could be limited 
under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). See Kagan, supra note 44, at 86. In September 2015, the 
plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit. Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Pineda-Cruz, 
5:15CV00326 (2015). 
 49 See infra notes 87–96 and accompanying text. 
 50 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”); id. amend. IV (“The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”). 
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of persons who are part of a national community or who have 
otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be 
considered part of that community.51 
This quote figured prominently in the DOJ brief in Pineda-Cruz, in which 
the DOJ argued that immigrants who had not been legally admitted could 
not claim First Amendment protection.52 
In the battle to define who “the people” refers to in the Constitution, 
the Second Amendment has been a particular flashpoint.53 For example, in 
both the Second and Fourth Amendments, the right is explicitly tied to “the 
people.” The Second Amendment states, “[T]he right of the people to keep 
and bear arms, shall not be infringed.”54 Similarly, the Fourth Amendment 
states, “[T]he right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”55 In 2011, in United States v. 
Portillo-Munoz, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit relied on 
Verdugo-Urquidez to conclude that an immigrant who was in the country 
illegally does not have the right to bear arms under the Second Amend-
ment.56 
In the Fifth Circuit decision about immigrants and the right to bear 
arms, a dissenting judge expressed alarm that this would mean that “mil-
lions of similarly situated residents of the United States are ‘non-persons’ 
who have no rights to be free from unjustified searches of their homes and 
bodies and other abuses, nor to peaceably assemble or petition the govern-
ment.”57 The proposition that excluding some immigrants from “the people” 
for purposes of certain constitutional rights deserves more careful consider-
ation. In 2008, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the United States Supreme 
Court quoted from Verdugo-Urquidez in concluding that “the people” is a 
“term of art” used with a consistent meaning in multiple amendments to 
refer to people with connections with the national community.58 The main 
holding in Heller, however, was simply that “the people” is a broader cate-
gory than the “militia,” so that the right to bear arms cannot be limited to 
                                                                                                                           
 51 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990). 
 52 Federal Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 7. 
 53 See MARK V. TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE: WHY THE CONSTITUTION CAN’T END THE BATTLE 
OVER GUNS, at xiv (2007) (describing the right to bear arms as “one of the arenas in which we as 
Americans try to figure out who we are”); Angela R. Riley, Indians and Guns, 100 GEO. L.J. 1675, 
1680–81 (2012) (describing gun rights as indicative of racial hierarchies in the United States). 
 54 U.S. CONST. amend. II (emphasis added). 
 55 Id. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
 56 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440. 
 57 Id. at 443. 
 58 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008). 
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members of a well-regulated militia.59 Heller holds only that all of the 
rights ascribed to “the people” in the Constitution are individual rights, not 
collective rights.60 
The Court’s proposition in Heller that “the people” is a consistent term 
of art is contestable as supported by a detailed textual and historical exami-
nation of the phrase in the Constitution conducted prior to the Heller deci-
sion.61 This examination concluded, much as the Court in Verdugo-
Urquidez, that “when the Constitution speaks of ‘the people’ rather than 
‘persons,’ the collective connotation is primary.”62 The term does not only 
appear in the Bill of Rights; it is also used to prescribe bi-annual elections 
to the House of Representatives.63 This focus on the national political com-
munity is a “republican reading” of the text.64 Maintaining an entirely con-
stant meaning for the phrase wherever it is used, however, is not possible: 
The Fourth Amendment is trickier: “The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” Here, 
the collective “people” wording is paired with more individualis-
tic language of “persons.” And these words obviously focus on 
the private domain, protecting individuals in their private homes 
more than in the public square.65 
Non-citizens were probably not part of “the people” though neither were 
women and children.66 Because this article focuses on the First Amendment, 
the Fourth Amendment is especially pertinent because both amendments 
mix individualist rights with a reference to the collective “people.” It would 
be a gross error, not to mention impractical, to suggest that only those peo-
ple registered or eligible to vote for the House of Representatives have a 
right to security of their persons or freedom from unreasonable searches. 
                                                                                                                           
 59 Id. at 580–81 (“[T]he ‘militia’ in colonial America consisted of a subset of ‘the people’—those 
who were male, able bodied, and within a certain age range. Reading the Second Amendment as pro-
tecting only the right to ‘keep and bear Arms’ in an organized militia therefore fits poorly with the 
operative clause’s description of the holder of that right as ‘the people.’”). 
 60 Id. at 580 (“Nowhere else in the Constitution does a ‘right’ attributed to ‘the people’ refer to 
anything other than an individual right.”). 
 61 Akil Reed Amar, The Second Amendment: A Case Study in Constitutional Interpretation, 2001 
UTAH L. REV. 889, 889–914. 
 62 Id. at 892; see Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265. 
 63 Amar, supra note 61, at 893; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
 64 Amar, supra note 61, at 893. 
 65 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV). This usage of “people” must be considered in light of 
James Madison’s expectation that juries would play a key role in adjudicating warrants and suggests 
juries as the embodiment of “the people” in the Constitution. Id. at 894. 
 66 Id. at 904. 
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One simple means of answering the question of free speech is limited 
to “the people” is to look at the text of the First Amendment. Although the 
Constitution’s actual words sometimes receive surprisingly little attention, 
on the present question, the text may offer a clear answer.67 The text of the 
First Amendment is quite different from the Second Amendment, which 
also suggests a variance in the usage of the phrase “the people.”68 The text 
does limit free assembly and the right to petition the government to “the 
people.”69 It also refers to other rights in broad, abstract terms: “the freedom 
of speech, or of the press” and “the free exercise [of religion].”70 Thus, 
whatever “the people” refers to, free speech is not one of the rights for 
which it matters. At most, the reference to the First Amendment in Verdugo-
Urquidez should be understood as referring to freedom of assembly but not 
to freedom of speech. This distinction is appropriate because assembly is a 
collective form of expression, and as a “republican reading” suggests, “the 
people” refers to collective rather than individualistic identity. The trouble 
here is that, although the Supreme Court has engaged in a close reading of 
“the people” in the context of the right to bear arms, the Court in Verdugo-
Urquidez was far more cursory in its reference to other parts of the Consti-
tution where “the people” is used. 
To return to the civil liberties of immigrants, there is nothing necessari-
ly objectionable about the Fifth Circuit’s narrow holding that unauthorized 
immigrants may be banned from owning a firearm. In Heller, the Supreme 
Court made clear that the Second Amendment permits a state to prohibit 
certain classes of people from firearms ownership, such as felons and the 
mentally ill.71 As the dissenting judge in Portillo-Munoz worried, however, 
it may be quite dangerous to exclude whole classes of people from being 
able to claim constitutional rights connected in any way to “the people.”72 A 
better way to frame this problem might follow what Justice Scalia wrote in 
Heller: “[L]ike most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is 
not unlimited.”73 The question is always whether a specific restriction on a 
                                                                                                                           
 67 See Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L. REV. 145, 
147 (2007) (“Most constitutional opinions do not [dwell on the Constitution itself]. Constitutional 
cases nowadays typically involve the application of settled constitutional precepts that all parties ac-
cept as binding. . . . At times the Constitution’s language can come to resemble a pea covered by a 
stack of judicial mattresses—a grain of sand no longer visible, though presumably resting deep inside 
the pearl of judicial elaboration.”). 
 68 See Ian Bartrum, Wittgenstein’s Poker: The Limits of Public Meaning Originalism and the 
Value of Contested Constitutionalism (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 69 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances”). 
 70 Id. 
 71 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
 72 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 443 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
 73 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
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specific right has an adequate justification. Although felons and the mental-
ly ill may be restricted from firearms purchases, it is inaccurate to say that 
they have no protection under the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, much less that they have no right to free expression 
or religion. This reasoning should also apply for immigrants. Moreover, 
“the people” in the Second Amendment should not be assumed to mean 
precisely the same thing as it does in the First and Fourth. 
A close reading of Verdugo-Urquidez offers an additional reason why 
that case should not be taken as a precedent for excluding immigrants from 
constitutional rights in the United States. Verdugo-Urquidez concerned ex-
traterritorial application of the Fourth Amendment. In that case, a criminal 
defendant sought to challenge an arrest that had been carried out in Mexi-
co.74 With that fairly unusual scenario in mind, the Court discussed the con-
nection between certain rights and “the people.” In this discussion, territori-
al boundaries were a critical factor, arguably the most important factor. The 
Court said, somewhat loosely, that “aliens receive constitutional protections 
when they have come within the territory of the United States and devel-
oped substantial connections with this country.”75 The holding was simply 
that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to an arrest of a Mexican in Mex-
ico because the right against unreasonable searches and seizures belongs to 
the people of the United States. In subsequent cases, the Court explained 
that Verdugo-Urquidez stands only for the principle that certain constitu-
tional protections are territorially limited to the United States.76 This territo-
rial limitation may be a useful tool to reconcile protection of free speech 
with the federal government’s plenary power over immigration. It may help 
to explain why free speech seems to carry less weight in a case where an 
immigrant is seeking to enter the United States, as was the case in the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court opinion in 1972 in Kleindienst v. Mandel, com-
pared to a case like Bridges, which concerned an immigrant already inside 
the country.77 This issue will be addressed in Part V. 
The fundamental question seems to be whether some rights that are 
protected in the United States require the formal consent of the United 
States. Immigrants who are unlawfully present in the country are here with-
out that consent. In its Pineda-Cruz brief, the DOJ claimed that immigrants 
who have not been legally admitted lack “connections” to the United 
                                                                                                                           
 74 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271. 
 75 Id. 
 76 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). 
 77 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769–70 (1972); Bridges, 326 U.S. at 135. In 
Kleindienst, the Court focused on the right of Americans to receive communications from a for-
eigner, rather than focusing on the speech rights of would-be immigrant. Even with this framing, 
the visa denial was affirmed. 408 U.S. at 762–63, 769–70. 
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States.78 That is a contestable point, as many unlawfully present immigrants 
have been in the country for lengthy periods and have well-developed fa-
milial, social and economic ties to the country.79 Even recent arrivals may 
have familial ties to the United States.80 If connections matter, one might 
ask why legal status is the only relevant criteria. Perhaps “connections” is 
really a poor choice of words. The real issue may be consent, or lack there-
of, to be part of the United States. 
Consent of the United States was central to the U.S Supreme Court’s 
holding in 1884 in Elk v. Wilkins that a Native American born in the United 
States could be denied the right to vote.81 The Court then said that the 
members of Indian tribes “owed immediate allegiance to their several 
tribes, and were not part of the people of the United States.”82 One reason 
the Court gave for this, as it related to the petitioner in that case, was that 
“he does not allege that the United States accepted his surrender, or that he 
has ever been naturalized, or taxed, or in any way recognized or treated as a 
citizen, by the state or by the United States.”83 Along these lines, one could 
analogize from Native Americans of the late Nineteenth Century to undoc-
umented immigrants of the Twenty-First Century, in that they are present 
and often deeply rooted in the United States, and yet the United States gov-
ernment has not accepted their residence here. Yet, to modern readers the 
treatment of racial minorities by the Supreme Court of the late Nineteenth 
Century is generally seen as appalling. The 1924 Indian Citizenship Act 
overturned the Court’s holding in Elk. This historical and moral evolution 
should lead to some caution about adopting similar reasoning today. 
Nevertheless, the basic idea that civil liberties require mutual consent 
has not gone away. Some have argued that nations are consensual political 
communities and the country’s right to determine its membership justified 
compromising the rights of would-be immigrants.84 The main implication of 
this idea, however, is that a country may prevent foreigners from entering, 
                                                                                                                           
 78 Federal Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 7, at 12. 
 79 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and ‘Community Ties’: A Response to Mar-
tin, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 244–46 (1983) (noting that community ties may develop even without 
formal admission to the community). 
 80 See, e.g., Teresa Wiltz, Unaccompanied Children from Central America, One Year Later, 
HUFFINGTONPOST (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/unaccompanied-children-
from-central-america-one-year-later_us_55db88b4e4b04ae497041d10 [https://perma.cc/3YL7-
YUUJ] (“Most of the children were released to family members; a few of them have no family in the 
U.S. and have been placed with foster families.”). 
 81 Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99 (1884). 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 39 
(1983). 
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even when they have compelling reasons to do so.85 This is a contestable 
proposition, but it does not speak to the question of what rights a foreigner 
should have once inside the United States. Even if there are some rights that 
require national consent, others would seem to be inherent in all people. For 
example, presumably no one would arbitrarily deprive foreigners of the 
right to life, no matter what their immigration status. In Elk, the question 
was about the right to vote, not the more basic right to free speech. The 
right to vote is distinct from speech and can be subject to more identity-
based restrictions, such as by citizenship and age, whereas free speech nor-
mally applies to a broader group of people— children under eighteen or ex-
felons, for example. 86 
In addition to the issue of national consent, the DOJ’s suggestion in 
Pineda-Cruz that only legally admitted immigrants can claim to be part of 
“the people” evokes an additional old debate about immigrant rights.87 The 
impetus for this debate was a “due process crisis involving excludable al-
iens” caused by a surge of asylum-seekers arriving to the United States, es-
pecially Haitians and Central Americans, in the 1980s.88 The crisis would 
eventually lead to a major overhaul of the American asylum system, but that 
was yet to come. The problem debated was fundamental and in many ways 
timeless: under what circumstances does the United States owe constitu-
tional rights—starting with procedural due process—to someone who ar-
rives uninvited? 
One view argued that more due process was owed to citizens and legal 
permanent residents than to first time applicants for admission.89 For this 
view, the process that is due to a person depends on their degree of mem-
bership in the national community, with citizens being at the core of the 
community and first-time applicants for admissions being in the “outermost 
ring of membership.”90 Though unauthorized immigrants admittedly devel-
op strong ties to the United States, in this view, these ties are not “mutual 
and reciprocal,” in the sense that the country had not consented to their arri-
                                                                                                                           
 85 See Nina Rabin, At the Border Between Public and Private: U.S. Immigration Policy for Vic-
tims of Domestic Violence, 7 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 109, 140–41 (2013) (discussing the implica-
tions of Walzer’s views for refugee rights). 
 86 See, e.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295–96 (1978) (“[A] State’s historical power to 
exclude aliens from participation in its democratic political institutions [is] part of the sovereign’s 
obligation to preserve the basic conception of a political community.”) (internal quotations and 
citation omitted); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648–49 (1973) (noting that citizenship may 
be a requirement for the ‘‘right to vote or to hold high public office’’). 
 87 Compare David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community: Politi-
cal Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 165, 208–34 (1983), with Aleinikoff, supra note 79, at 
244–46. 
 88 Martin, supra note 87, at 168. 
 89 Id. at 191–92. 
 90 Id. at 210–16. 
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val, and thus do not count for as much in terms of constitutional rights.91 
This essentially is the same argument that the DOJ made in Pineda-Cruz. 
An opposing view raised two important objections to the community 
membership theory of immigrant rights. First, the essence of constitutional 
rights is about limiting the power of government, not about determining the 
degree of protection owed to different people.92 This reframing is important 
because constitutional protection is typically most important for those mar-
ginalized from the national community, not those whose membership is 
most secure.93 The focus on government power also fits the text of the First 
Amendment.94 Second, to define immigrants’ constitutional rights accord-
ing to immigration statutes would rob courts of any yardstick by which to 
measure the constitutionality of those very laws.95 Congress defines, by 
statute, who may be legally admitted to the country, who may be a legal 
permanent resident, and ultimately who may naturalize as a citizen. If these 
categories also determine the applicability of constitutional rights, then 
Congress would have the power to limit the reach of the Constitution by 
mere statute. Such a possibility would endanger the principle of constitu-
tional supremacy under which statutes must conform to the Constitution.96 
It would introduce a dangerous loophole to the system of constitutional 
rights. 
For these reasons, the DOJ proposition that non-admitted immigrants 
have no claim to First Amendment protection is unconvincing. Even if this 
broad claim ultimately fails (or, rather, should fail, since it has yet to be di-
rectly adjudicated), the fact remains that the Supreme Court has not square-
                                                                                                                           
 91 Id. at 230–31. 
 92 Aleinikoff, supra note 79, at 240 (“But why, we may ask, should different levels of ‘recip-
rocal obligations’ translate into greater protections ‘owed’ by the state to the person? Is it not 
arguable that the due process clause establishes procedural and substantive limits on the govern-
ment’s ability to inflict harm, and that it applies with equal force on behalf of all persons within 
the United States?”). 
 93 Id. (“[A]re not those in the outer rings of membership arguably in need of greater protec-
tion because they are not permitted to participate in the political process and traditionally have 
been the subjects of discriminatory legislation?”). 
 94 U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law . . . .”). 
 95 Aleinikoff, supra note 79, at 241–42 (“One might argue that these obligations are a result of 
the operation of law: the granting of immigration status and the imposition of certain obligations on the 
alien create reciprocal obligations owed to the alien by the community. The trouble with this view is 
that it would give Congress plenary power to decide the due process issue through definition of classes 
of aliens and imposition (or not) of particular obligations. . . . Congress has broad power to decide who 
may enter and who must leave, but the Court will independently assess the procedures Congress 
adopts to carry out those decisions.”). 
 96 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (“It is also not entirely unworthy 
of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first 
mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in 
pursuance of the constitution, have that rank. . . . [A] law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that 
courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.”). 
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ly addressed it. Moreover, there are reasons to wonder how broadly the Su-
preme Court’s statement in Bridges about free speech rights of aliens can be 
confidently interpreted. These doubts form a backdrop to two specific ap-
plications of free speech law where the Court has indeed allowed substan-
tial limitations on immigrants’ freedom of speech. These will be addressed 
in Parts II and III. 
II. LIMITATIONS ON ELECTION-RELATED SPEECH BY NON-CITIZENS 
Even if all immigrants have First Amendment protection, Congress—
with approval from the Supreme Court—has carved out an exception for 
election-related speech for immigrants who are not legal permanent resi-
dents. This exception represents a sharp contrast with the Court’s treatment 
of other campaign finance restrictions. The Supreme Court famously struck 
down restrictions on independent campaign expenditures by organizations 
in Citizen United v. FEC, in 2010, and on aggregate campaign contribution 
limits in McCutcheon v. FEC, in 2014.97 One may reasonably wonder how 
much practical impact campaign finance law might have on most affected 
immigrants, who presumably do not have the resources to make large cam-
paign contributions. The restrictions that have been enacted, however, have 
considerable reach. They ban small money donations to candidates as well 
as private independent “expenditures” that could involve no more than pho-
tocopying fliers to express a view for or against a candidate.98 Thus, these 
election restrictions impact a kind of private speech that is normally thought 
of as core to the First Amendment. 
Given that many undocumented or unauthorized immigrants have be-
come politically mobilized in favor of immigration reform, these re-
strictions could potentially limit activists’ expressive choices or be used lat-
er to punish them.99 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s approval of such re-
strictions at a time when it has dismantled other campaign finance regula-
tions as undue violations of the right to free speech shows that immigrants 
cannot be confident that the justices see their right to expression as falling 
clearly within the First Amendment. 
                                                                                                                           
 97 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 
310, 341 (2010); see also infra notes 127–136 and accompanying text. 
 98 See infra notes 127–136 and accompanying text. 
 99 In the 2016 election, some prominent undocumented activists made public endorsements, 
though it is not clear if they technically expended funds to do so. See, e.g., Astrid Silva, I Stand with 
Hillary Because She Stands with Immigrant Families, UNIVISION NOTICIAS (Feb. 3, 2016), 
http://www.univision.com/noticias/opinion/astrid-silva-i-stand-with-hillary-because-she-stands-
with-immigrant-families [https://perma.cc/9EDH-FSP3]; Tamara Keith, Clinton Charms DREAM-
ers on Immigration, NPR (May 6, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/05/06/
404649454/clinton-charms-dreamers-on-immigration [https://perma.cc/YCR7-WUE3]. 
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Congress has steadily expanded the ban on non-citizen contributions to 
election campaigns since the 1960s.100 Originally, agents of foreign gov-
ernments and organizations were prohibited from donating directly to can-
didates for office.101 In 1974, during the Watergate era, Congress banned all 
foreign nationals, except for legal permanent residents, from donating di-
rectly to candidates.102 In 2002, Congress expanded that ban to include do-
nations to candidates and political parties as well as independent expendi-
tures related to an election.103 In 2012, in Bluman v. FEC, the United States 
Supreme Court upheld this ban without decision.104 
The federal law at issue in Bluman bans foreign nationals, except for 
legal permanent residents, from making “a contribution or donation of 
money or other thing of value . . . in connection with a federal, state, or lo-
cal election.”105 Violation of this statute can constitute a federal crime pun-
ishable by up to one year in prison if it involved spending $2000 or more in 
a single year, with progressively stiffer sentences possible for larger viola-
tions.106 Violations totaling less than $2000 can lead to civil penalties up to 
$10,000 if the violation was “knowing and willful” and up to $5000 even if 
there is no finding that the offense was “knowing and willful.”107 
The speech ban affirmed in Bluman goes farther than restricting dona-
tions to candidates and parties. It applies to any spending “in connection 
with” an election. It thus prohibits non-citizens from “making expenditures 
to expressly advocate the election or defeat of a political candidate; and 
from making donations to outside groups when those donations in turn 
would be used . . . to finance express-advocacy expenditures.”108 
The case law on this provision has focused on monetary donations, 
though the statute potentially extends even farther. It applies to a contribu-
tion of any “thing of value.”109 That phrase might be read to ban non-
citizens from volunteering their time and labor in relation to election cam-
                                                                                                                           
 100 See Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 283 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 132 S.Ct. 1087 (Mem) 
(2012). 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 284. 
 104 Bluman v. FEC, 132 S. Ct. 1087, 1087 (Mem.) (2012); see also Alyssa Markenson, What’s at 
Stake? Bluman v. Federal Election Commission and the Incompatibility of the Stake-Based Immigra-
tion Plenary Power and Freedom of Speech, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 209, 238 (2014) (“Until Bluman, the 
Court had never held that the speech of aliens lawfully in the United States could be criminalized 
where it could not be if spoken by citizens.”). 
 105 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)–(b) (2012) (defining foreign nationals as all foreign citizens, except for 
lawful permanent residents). 
 106 See id. § 30109(d)(1)(A) (listing penalties for violations over $2000). 
 107 Id. § 30109(a)(6)(B)–(C). 
 108 Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 284. 
 109 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a). 
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paigns. The Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) has issued two contra-
dictory decisions on whether “uncompensated volunteer services” are per-
missible.110 Even if volunteering is allowed, current law would prohibit a 
non-citizen who is not a legal permanent resident—in other words, a stu-
dent, temporary worker, or an unauthorized immigrant—from spending her 
own money to take out an ad in a newspaper or on Facebook that says, 
“Support Candidate X” or “Oppose Candidate Y.” 
For example, consider the situation of Mexican immigrants who were 
outraged when presidential candidate Donald Trump said, “When Mexico 
sends its people, they’re not sending their best. . . . They’re sending people 
that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. 
They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists.”111 A Mex-
ican immigrant in the United States—whether a student or an unauthorized 
immigrant—would be in a unique position to respond to that statement, 
both in terms of personal motivation and in possessing a rhetorical capacity 
to personalize a pointed response. Yet, under the law affirmed by the Su-
preme Court, a Mexican citizen, if not a legal permanent resident, may not 
spend her own money to print posters that say, “My family are not rapists. 
Don’t vote for Trump.” In Bluman, one of the plaintiffs was banned from 
printing his own leaflets supporting President Obama that he wanted to dis-
tribute in Central Park in New York City.112 Thus, if an immigrant were to 
distribute leaflets protesting an anti-immigrant candidate, relying on the 
false belief that such conduct is protected free speech, she could be subject 
to a civil fine.113 In Part IV below, this article will discuss more about why 
this kind of speech, in which content and speaker identity combine to form 
a persuasive message, is uniquely valuable and should be protected by the 
Constitution.114 
Because the Supreme Court issued no opinion to explain its decision in 
Bluman, all that remains is the lower court decision, which fails to explain 
its conclusion persuasively. The district court in Bluman reasoned that the 
ban on political activities by non-citizens could survive strict scrutiny.115 A 
                                                                                                                           
 110 See FED. ELECTIONS COMM’N, FOREIGN NATIONALS 1, 3 (July 2003) (describing a 1987 case 
permitting volunteer services to a presidential campaign, and a 1981 case prohibiting a non-citizen 
from donating artwork to a Senate campaign). 
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 114 See infra notes 205–254 and accompanying text. 
 115 Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 285. 
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panel of three judges found that Congress had a concern about “foreign na-
tionals’ financial influence on elections” and that there is a compelling in-
terest in “preventing foreign influence over the U.S. political process.”116 
The panel analogized participation in electoral campaigns to other activities 
that may be limited to U.S. citizens, such as voting, serving on a jury, or 
working as a police officer or public school teacher.117 These functions con-
stitute “activities of American democratic self-government.”118 As discussed  
in Part I, these are also the kinds of activities that the Bill of Rights consid-
ers to be rights of “the people,” and thus may indeed be limited to members 
of the national community. It is doubtful, however, whether the First 
Amendment’s protection of speech properly belongs in that category. 
An initial problem with the district court’s reasoning is that immigrants 
are not the only people in the United States who cannot vote or serve on 
juries. This is also true of children under eighteen, but a federal district 
court has found that a limit on campaign donations by minors is likely a 
violation of the First Amendment.119 Under Citizens United, corporate enti-
ties have a constitutional right to make expenditures related to elections 
though corporations cannot vote, much less work as school teachers or 
serve on juries.120 Acknowledging these weaknesses in its own argument, 
the district court in Bluman said that the key criteria for making campaign 
expenditures is not really about performing any particular function but ra-
ther about being “American:” 
The statute does not serve a compelling interest in limiting the 
participation of non-voters in the activities of democratic self-
government; it serves the compelling interest of limiting the par-
ticipation of non-Americans in the activities of democratic self-
government . . . . Plaintiffs point out that many groups of people 
who are not entitled to vote may nonetheless make contributions 
and expenditures related to elections—for example, minors, 
American corporations, and citizens of states or municipalities 
other than the state or municipality of the elective office. But mi-
nors, American corporations, and citizens of other states and mu-
nicipalities are all members of the American political communi-
ty.121 
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The notion of an American corporation is puzzling because non-
Americans might own corporate shares or even serve as corporate officers. 
For multinational corporations, both the corporate identity and the source of 
revenue may be a matter of accounting convenience rather than a reflection 
of corporate identity, because money is fungible and the location of corpo-
rate registration might reflect a taxation strategy more than business identi-
ty.122 Moreover, even if a corporation were based in the United States and 
operated solely in the United States, foreigners could buy up a majority of 
its shares. If the concern is about controlling foreign influence on American 
politics, such a corporation could be seen as a serious threat.123 The FEC 
has struggled to cope with this problem. The FEC has advised that “a do-
mestic subsidiary of a foreign corporation” may not donate in connection 
with an American election if “these activities are financed by the foreign 
parent or owner.”124 Thus, according to the FEC, a foreign corporation op-
erating in the United States might still donate if the donations are supported 
solely by American business activities.125 Accordingly, the FEC seems to 
focus less on the identity of the corporation as American or foreign and 
more on its main place of business and the source of the money used in the 
political activity.126 If the corporation is effectively controlled from abroad, 
it is unclear why a political donation is less concerning just because the rev-
enue originated in the United States. 
Another significant problem with the reasoning of the district court in 
Bluman concerns the concept of “foreign influence.” This concept of influ-
ence seems very close to the broad conception of corruption that the majori-
                                                                                                                           
 122 See id. at 624 (“The global economy has removed the ease with which one may determine 
whether a corporation is foreign. Besides considering a corporation’s place of incorporation—a mere 
legal formality—one may clarify the ‘foreign’ nature of a corporation by examining the composition of 
a corporation’s workforce, the division of ownership, the make-up of its board of directors, the location 
of its headquarters, and the countries in which it holds the highest market share. None of these ele-
ments alone is dispositive of when foreign interests play a meaningful role. For example, General 
Electric, an iconic American corporation incorporated in New York, has its headquarters in Connecti-
cut but more employees overseas than in the United States.”). 
 123 See, e.g., Matt A. Vega, The First Amendment Lost in Translation: Preventing Foreign Influ-
ence in U.S. Elections After Citizens United v. FEC, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 951, 997 (2011) (arguing 
that “[t]he political branches of the U.S. government should enjoy wide constitutional latitude to regu-
late the political speech of not only foreign corporations but foreign-controlled and foreign-owned 
American corporations as well”). 
 124 FED. ELECTION COMM’N, supra note 110. 
 125 See generally Scott L. Friedman, First Amendment and “Foreign-Controlled” U.S. Corpora-
tions: Why Congress Ought to Affirm Domestic Subsidiaries’ Corporate Political-Speech Rights, 46 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 613 (2013) (arguing that it would be problematic to treat domestic subsidiar-
ies differently from wholly American corporations). 
 126 See id. at 632. 
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ty of the Supreme Court rejected in Citizens United and in McCutcheon.127 
In those cases, the Court found that the government’s interest in preventing 
political corruption must be limited to “quid pro quo” corruption.128 Quid 
pro quo corruption involves “a direct exchange of an official act for mon-
ey”129 and is similar to criminal bribery.130 By contrast, the dissent in 
McCutcheon argued for a broader understanding of the anti-corruption in-
terest so as to also include “undue influence” because politicians will be 
“too compliant with the wishes of large contributors” and will grant them 
“disproportionate access.”131 The concern about foreign influence in Blu-
man seems consistent with this broader conception about undue influence 
beyond quid pro quo bribery. The Court has, however, rejected this view, at 
least when it concerned large donations by Americans and American com-
panies. The plurality in McCutcheon said “government regulation may not 
target the general gratitude a candidate may feel toward those who support 
him or his allies, or the political access such support may afford.”132 
It is instructive that the Constitution itself contains a provision aimed 
at preventing foreign influence over American government. The Foreign 
Gifts Clause prohibits any office holder from accepting “any present” from 
a foreign state.133 The Foreign Gifts Clause interestingly prohibits gifts re-
gardless of whether there was any direct exchange and thus shows that the 
Framers were concerned about undue influence even in the absence of quid 
pro quo corruption. Proponents of campaign finance regulation have cited 
the Foreign Gifts Clause to support the claim that the Constitution embraces 
a broad anti-corruption concern.134 Certainly, if this position is correct, then 
it would be permissible to restrict expenditures of foreign money in U.S. 
elections—but it would also be permissible to restrict large expenditures by 
wealthy Americans and corporations. However, the Foreign Gifts Clause 
applies only to gifts attributable to a foreign sovereign, and thus is far more 
narrowly focused than the statute affirmed in Bluman which applies to non-
citizens as private individuals.135 Other writers have argued for an even nar-
                                                                                                                           
 127 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (plurality opinion); Citizens United, 558 
U.S. at 360 (“[I]ngratiation and access . . . are not corruption.”). 
 128 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441, 1450. 
 129 Id. at 1441; id. at 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 130 Id. at 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 131 Id. at 1469, 1470 (internal quotations omitted). 
 132 Id. at 1441 (Roberts, J., plurality). 
 133 U.S. CONST art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
 134 See generally Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 
361–62 (2009) (relying on the provisions of the Constitution, including the Foreign Gifts Clause, to 
argue that courts should treat an anti-corruption interest as a significant constitutional principle). 
 135 Id. (“[N]o Person holding any Office . . . shall, without the Consent of Congress, accept of any 
present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatsoever, from any King, Prince, or foreign 
state.”). 
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rower reading of the Foreign Gifts Clause, applying only to appointed office 
holders, and thus having little bearing on regulation of campaigns for elect-
ed offices.136 This view is closer to that of the McCutcheon plurality, but it 
raises a question about why campaign expenditures by immigrants should 
be singled out for regulation. 
Though not the focus of this article, the dissent in McCutcheon pro-
vides a persuasive view regarding the anti-corruption interest.137 The con-
cern that unregulated political donations corrode democracy does not de-
pend on whether the donations are made by a large corporation, a union, or 
wealthy non-citizens who live in the United States.138 The Court has already 
addressed this issue, however, and has settled on the narrower quid pro quo 
definition of corruption, rejecting concern about “general influence” flow-
ing from political donations.139 This makes it difficult to explain Bluman. 
The Court needs to explain how expenditures by non-citizens raise a com-
pelling concern about undue influence, even without evidence of a quid pro 
quo exchange, whereas expenditures by American corporations or American 
individuals do not. The decisive variable here seems not to be money be-
cause the Citizens United majority is not generally concerned about money 
enhancing access to politicians. How can it be that large scale political 
spending by an American-based corporation poses no compelling risk of 
corruption, but an immigrant distributing leaflets in a park does? The key 
variable that explains Bluman is not how much money a non-citizen is will-
ing or able to spend on politics nor the potential for influence stemming 
from the speech. It is the fact that the speaker is not an American. 
The statutory provision allowing election expenditures by legal per-
manent residents but not by other immigrants complicates the speech prob-
lem further. In effect, this means that Congress has been able to pick and 
choose among speakers.140 If Congress allows a category of people to ac-
quire legal permanent resident status, it also allows them to express them-
selves more freely in elections. On the flip side, Congress can also limit 
speech rights by passing immigration statutes limiting legal permanent resi-
                                                                                                                           
 136 See Seth Barrett Tillman, The Original Public Meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause: A 
Reply to Professor Zephyr Teachout, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 180, 181–82 (2013), http://
scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1065&context=nulr_online. 
 137 For a compelling argument on this issue, see Lawrence Lessig, A Reply to Professor Hasen, 
126 HARV. L. REV. F. 61, 65 (2013), http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/
forvol126_lessig.pdf (arguing that there is a compelling and constitutionally legitimate government 
interest in curtailing “dependence corruption,” through which elected officials depend on the wealthy 
to support their electoral campaigns, rather than depending on the people at large). 
 138 See, e.g., id. at 66 (arguing that dependence on large donors ties politicians to a “tiny slice” of 
the public). 
 139 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451. 
 140 See Markenson, supra note 104, at 231–33. 
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dence. Such a law is difficult to square with the Court’s recent election law 
cases that are founded on the premise that Congress may not favor some 
speakers over others based on their identity.141 Bluman appears to be based 
on the theory that non-citizens’ constitutional rights depend on the degree to 
which they have a stake in American society.142 This theory was typical of 
the Supreme Court’s immigration decisions in the mid-Twentieth Century 
but seemed to fade in its influence in more recent cases about the procedur-
al due process rights of non-citizens in immigration detention.143 A legal 
permanent resident may have lived in the United States for just a few days 
if she entered on the right visa, whereas temporary workers or students—as 
well as millions of unauthorized immigrants—may have been here for 
years. By enacting or revising immigrant visa regulations, Congress can 
also dial up or dial down the freedom that different people in the United 
States have to express themselves. In other words, Bluman effectively al-
lows a statute to control the reach of the Constitution. This is the same prob-
lem described in Part I with the proposition that immigration law should 
limit the definition of “the people” in the Constitution. 
Because non-citizens cannot vote, the central question is whether they 
may engage in speech so as to try to persuade citizens how to use their vot-
ing power. Congress has effectively decreed that citizens and legal perma-
nent residents may try to persuade voters, but other non-citizens may not.144 
In other election speech cases, however, the Court has said that the govern-
ment may not decide which speech should and should not be permitted to 
potentially influence an election. For example, in McCutcheon, Chief Jus-
tice Roberts wrote for the plurality that “Congress may not . . . restrict the 
political participation of some in order to enhance the relative influence of 
others.”145 This is why the Court has rejected efforts to “level the playing 
field” in order to neutralize the disproportionate influence available to those 
with more money through which to broadcast their message.146 This article 
returns to this problem in Part IV. 
                                                                                                                           
 141 See id. at 225. 
 142 See id. at 217. 
 143 Id. at 218–23. 
 144 See 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)–(b) (2012) (defining foreign nationals as all foreign citizens, except 
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 145 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441. 
 146 Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2836 (2011) (“Level-
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The urgent question here is why Congress should be able to ban speech 
by non-citizens rather than leave it to the voters themselves to decide how 
to respond to their attempts at persuasion. Certainly, there may be varying 
opinions about whether it is a good thing for non-Americans to participate 
in American electoral debates. In other situations, the Court has warned that 
“the degree to which speech is protected cannot turn on a legislative or ju-
dicial determination that particular speech is useful to the democratic pro-
cess.”147 Moreover, there is more at stake than just the expressive rights of 
immigrants themselves. Some citizens may want to hear what the immigrants 
have to say—especially given the prominent role of immigration policy in our 
political discourse.148 The Court has cogently addressed these concerns in 
announcing a rule against speaker discrimination, which will be discussed in 
more detail in Part IV. 
III. SELECTIVE IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT TO REPRESS  
IMMIGRANT DISSENT 
Typically, concern about free speech focuses on forms of prior restraint 
before speech, or criminal punishment or civil liability after expressive ac-
tivity. Immigrants, however, have a unique, additional vulnerability that 
does not impact citizens: they can be deported. Deportation can be an effi-
cient means for the government to eliminate troublesome political oppo-
nents. It may also function as a punishment for political activity even if the 
law does not formally categorize it that way. The threat of deportation may 
act as a deterrent that silences other immigrants. Plainly explained: “If a 
foreign national has no First Amendment rights in the deportation setting, 
he has no First Amendment rights anywhere; the fear of deportation will 
always and everywhere restrict what he says.”149 Unfortunately, the Su-
preme Court has yet to fully recognize this problem. 
In 1904, the Supreme Court in U.S. ex rel. Turner v. Williams first dealt 
with politically motivated deportation.150 On October 23, 1903, federal of-
ficers arrested John Turner in New York City. He was then detained at Ellis 
Island while he fought deportation through a petition for a writ of habeas 
                                                                                                                           
 147 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1449. Elsewhere, the plurality notes that a majority of the public 
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corpus.151 Turner was an English citizen, and was accused by the U.S. gov-
ernment of being an anarchist.152 He had given a speech in New York call-
ing for general labor strikes and was found in possession of anarchist publi-
cations.153 The federal government sought to deport him based on a statute 
enacted just seven months before his arrest that excluded “anarchists” from 
entry to the United States.154 Turner, however, was already in the country. 
The same statute also stated “nothing in this act shall exclude persons con-
victed of an offense purely political, not involving moral turpitude.”155 
Turner argued that the law violated the First Amendment, and his case 
reached the Supreme Court. He lost. 
To a reader familiar with immigration law as it exists today, Turner is 
an odd decision because the Court never says what Turner’s immigration 
status actually was. The Court never even states clearly how long he had 
been in the country, nor how he had entered—much less whether his entry 
was legal or illegal. He claimed that he had applied for citizenship six years 
before his arrest, and that is the only fact regarding his immigration histo-
ry.156 One can only assume that his citizenship application was unsuccess-
ful, but apparently, he had resided in the United States for several years. 
The lower court decision in Turner gave little additional information; it 
dispatched the First Amendment claim with a single sentence: “As to 
abridgment of the freedom of speech, that clause deals with the speech of 
persons in the United States, and has no bearing upon the question what 
persons shall be allowed to enter therein.”157 This made no sense, of course. 
Turner was not trying to enter the country; he was already here. He was ar-
rested because he gave a speech in New York City and was taken by federal 
agents to Ellis Island.158 Federal agents took him from the interior of the 
country to the border. In 1903, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence gave lit-
tle reason to distinguish between entry and expulsion—what we would to-
day call admission and removal. The 1889 Chinese Exclusion Case, the 
seminal Supreme Court case establishing federal power over immigration, 
was about a Chinese man who wanted to enter at a port.159 Four years later, 
in 1893, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the Supreme Court found that 
the judiciary had little role in reviewing the arrest and expulsion of a Chi-
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nese man who had been living in New York City for more than ten years.160 
This is, to some extent, an anachronism. By mid-century, the Court began to 
make a significant distinction between would-be immigrants stopped at the 
border and those who are already inside the country. In 1950, in Shaugh-
nessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, the Supreme Court said that non-
citizens who have entered the United States have a claim to due process 
before they are deported, even if they had entered illegally.161 By contrast, 
when non-citizens are stopped at the border, “[w]hatever the procedure au-
thorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is 
concerned.”162 
The following quotation from the Turner decision demonstrates how 
the Court flatly refused to acknowledge that deporting a man because of his 
political expression has any implications for freedom of speech: 
We are at a loss to understand in what way the act is obnoxious to 
[the First Amendment] objection. It has no reference to an estab-
lishment of religion nor does it prohibit the free exercise thereof; 
nor abridge the freedom of speech or of the press; nor the right of 
the people to assemble and petition the government for a redress 
of grievances. It is, of course, true that if an alien is not permitted 
to enter this country, or, having entered contrary to law, is ex-
pelled, he is in fact cut off from worshipping or speaking or pub-
lishing or petitioning in the country, but that is merely because of 
his exclusion therefrom. He does not become one of the people to 
whom these things are secured by our Constitution by an attempt 
to enter forbidden by law. To appeal to the Constitution is to con-
cede that this is a land governed by that supreme law, and as un-
der it the power to exclude has been determined to exist, those 
who are excluded cannot assert the rights in general obtaining in a 
land to which they do not belong as citizens or otherwise.163 
According to the Court, so long as he is free to speak his mind some-
where else, there is no free speech violation.164 This rationale is hard to take 
seriously. If the police were to ban a political group from speaking on the 
National Mall because the government disapproved of their ideology, would 
it be legitimate be to say, “You are still free to speak somewhere else?” 
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 161 Shaughnessy v. U.S ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953). 
 162 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950). 
 163 U.S. ex rel. Turner, 194 U.S. at 292. 
 164 Id. (“He is in fact cut off from worshipping or speaking or publishing or petitioning in the 
country, but that is merely because of his exclusion therefrom.”). 
1264 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:1237 
The Court’s limited conception of free speech in Turner was typical of 
its time. It wasn’t until the 1930s that the Court began to extend more mean-
ingful First Amendment protection to labor activists.165 Yet, it is not entirely 
clear that the Court has evolved in the same way with regard to the connec-
tion between immigration and speech. Turner was followed by two McCar-
thy era cases that similarly dismissed any First Amendment protection 
against ideologically motivated deportations. In 1952, in Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy, the Supreme Court allowed the government to retroactively 
apply a 1940 law that authorized deportation of longtime residents due to 
their former membership in the Communist Party, even if their membership 
ceased before the law was enacted.166 In 1954, in Galvan v. Press, the Su-
preme Court reached a similar holding regarding the deportation of a former 
member of the Communist Party who was born in Mexico and who had 
been a U.S. resident for thirty-six years.167 The Court deferred to the politi-
cal branches to answer questions about who should be allowed into the 
country, reasoning that “[t]he power of Congress over the admission of al-
iens and their right to remain is necessarily very broad.”168 The Court al-
lowed Galvan’s deportation over the dissent of Justices Black, who com-
plained, “I am unwilling to say [] that despite these constitutional safe-
guards this man may be driven from our land because he joined a political 
party that California and the Nation then recognized as perfectly legal.”169 
In the 1970s, there were indications that the Court might revise the 
Turner approach primarily by drawing a distinction between people apply-
ing to enter the United States and those who were already here. In 1972, in 
Kleindienst v. Mandel, the United States Supreme Court considered the 
government’s authority to refuse a visa to a Belgian socialist who was invit-
ed to speak at American universities.170 The Court recognized that exclud-
ing an invited speaker implicated free speech interests of United States citi-
zens to receive information, a principle that it would later echo in Citizens 
United.171 Free speech involves the rights of listeners as well as speakers. 
Nonetheless, the Court found that the federal government’s vast plenary 
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power to control entrance into the United States overcame any First 
Amendment objections.172 The Court held that because of “plenary congres-
sional power to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens,” a decision 
to exclude a would-be foreign visitor should stand so long as it is “on the 
basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason.”173 This is a very lenient 
standard for the government compared to the heightened scrutiny that 
would normally be trigged by a fundamental rights violation, but it seems to 
apply only with regard to a denial of a visa to enter the country.174 Even in 
that situation, the Kleindienst Court suggested a half step retreat from the 
Court’s position in Turner that the First Amendment was not even implicat-
ed at all. The Court held open the possibility that there might be some ex-
treme case in which the government lacked a sufficiently legitimate reason 
to deny a visa.175 
At the time of the Kleindienst case, it seemed that courts might react 
differently when the government used its immigration power to expel a po-
litical opponent who was already in the country. Around that time, the Nix-
on Administration initiated deportation proceedings against former Beatle 
John Lennon.176 Lennon was already in the United States, and was seeking 
to avoid deportation. He was widely known for his anti-war activism and 
had been under surveillance by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) 
because of his political activities.177 Rather than rely on an overtly ideologi-
cal exclusion like the bar on Communists and anarchists, however, the gov-
ernment sought to have him excluded because of a 1968 British conviction 
for possession of cannabis resin.178 Lennon argued that he was the victim of 
selective enforcement and that the government’s real reasons for targeting 
him were entirely political.179 He found a receptive audience for this argu-
ment with the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The panel stated, 
“The courts will not condone selective deportation based upon secret politi-
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cal grounds.”180 The Second Circuit, however, avoided relying on the selec-
tive enforcement ground, holding instead that the British criminal law under 
which Lennon had been convicted did not constitute a conviction of mariju-
ana possession under immigration law because the British law had no 
knowledge requirement in the crime.181 
Had the Second Circuit’s dicta carried the day, the First Amendment 
could act as a check on politically motivated deportations from inside the 
United States. Instead, the selective prosecution question reached the Su-
preme Court in 1999 in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Com-
mittee (“AADC”), and the Court declared, “As a general matter–and assur-
edly in the context of claims such as those put forward in the present case–
an alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to assert selec-
tive enforcement as a defense against his deportation.”182 
AADC appears to raise the specter that immigrants could be driven to 
silence for fear of deportation.183 The majority in the decision noted that 
selective prosecution defenses rarely prevail in the criminal context because 
there is a presumption that prosecutors act lawfully.184 The Court, however, 
refused to allow non-citizens to even attempt to surmount that challenge 
because executive discretion in immigration enforcement is especially 
broad.185 Somewhat ironically, this embrace of prosecutorial discretion in 
AADC has been widely cited in support of President Obama’s executive 
actions that aggressively use grant-deferred action to benefit millions of 
immigrants who are unlawfully present.186 Yet, the most direct application 
of AADC would be if a future president who is hostile to immigrant activ-
ism deliberately sought to deport unauthorized immigrants who had publi-
cally campaigned for immigration reform. 
The majority decision in AADC echoes the Turner Court’s reluctance 
to acknowledge that the threat of deportation could impact freedom of 
speech. The Court in AADC reasoned that selective prosecution is less of a 
concern in immigration than in criminal cases because deportation is “not 
imposed as a punishment.”187 For this proposition, the Court relied on a 
mid-Twentieth Century case concerning detention of non-citizens in which 
the majority failed to address free speech concerns involved with the at-
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tempt to deport alleged members of the Communist Party.188 Recently, some 
lower courts have cast doubt on the continued relevance of McCarthy era 
cases, dismissing them as “a product of their time.”189 Two years after 
AADC, the Supreme Court held that immigration enforcement “is subject to 
important constitutional limitations.”190 The Court has not made clear 
whether the First Amendment is one of those limitations, though AADC 
suggests that it is not. 
The reasoning that deportation is not punishment, and thus does not 
pose as serious a threat to free speech as criminal prosecution, is difficult to 
reconcile with recent Supreme Court cases in which the Court has recog-
nized that for many immigrants, deportation can be a worse consequence 
than imprisonment.191 It is also difficult to square this logic with other First 
Amendment cases in which the Court has found free speech violations in 
non-criminal contexts with fairly minimal sanctions. For example, the Court 
has found that a confidential state bar reprimand of an attorney could in-
fringe the First Amendment, even without a license suspension or any pub-
lic sanctioning of the attorney.192 The Court has also found free speech to be 
infringed by the imposition of a fine of $100.193 The Court has further ap-
plied First Amendment protections in the context of tort cases.194 It is thus 
not convincing to explain the result of AADC by reference to either the non-
criminal nature of immigration enforcement or the relative severity of the 
consequences. It seems that the Court was simply reluctant to fully extend 
free speech protections into the realm of immigration enforcement. 
Nevertheless, there are subtle indications in AADC that the ground has 
shifted considerably since the era of the Turner decision and that the hold-
ing of the AADC case may be tied quite closely to its facts. The Court con-
cluded, “[W]e need not rule out the possibility of a rare case in which the 
alleged basis of discrimination is so outrageous that the foregoing consider-
ations can be overcome. Whether or not there be such exceptions, the gen-
eral rule certainly applies here.”195 
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Based on the reasoning of the AADC court, there is a general rule that 
there is no selective deportation defense to deportation, but the possibility 
that there could be an extreme case in which a free speech-based selective 
prosecution argument might prevail still exists. In this respect, it is probably 
relevant that the non-citizens in AADC were uniquely unsympathetic, and 
the government’s arguments for discretion were uniquely compelling. The 
case began in 1987 when the government sought to deport eight members of 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (“PFLP”), which “the 
Government characterizes as an international terrorist and communist or-
ganization.”196 In AADC, Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) 
officials made public statements that the real reason for pursuing deporta-
tion was the respondents’ political affiliation that gave rise to the selective 
enforcement issue.197 In explaining why this defense could not be raised, 
the Court noted that there could be sensitive foreign policy and intelligence 
concerns in a deportation decision.198 The respondents’ suspected member-
ship in a potential terror group operating in the context of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict seemingly makes these concerns especially strong. The 
Court explains its holding in terms that are tied closely to this somewhat 
unusual factual context.199 
Initially, the INS charged the immigrants in the AADC case with advo-
cating world communism, designated as a ground for deportation by the 
immigration statute, and also with technical violations of immigration law, 
such as overstaying visas.200 When the eight respondents challenged the 
constitutionality of the world communism ground, the INS dropped it, rely-
ing instead on the technical grounds.201 Therefore, in the late 1990s, the 
government avoided testing the rule that had prevailed half a century earlier 
in Harisiades and Galvan. Despite ruling against the immigrants’ free 
speech claims, the Court in AADC never cited Harisiades, Galvan, or 
Turner—although the Court did not directly repudiate them. This is often 
the manner in which immigration law doctrine evolves, without a block-
buster case overruling precedent in the mode of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion. There is indeed good reason to doubt the doctrinal foundations of the 
earlier cases. In 1952, the Court thought that membership in “an organiza-
tion advocating overthrow of government by force” was not protected free 
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speech.202 Thus, the immigration cases involving membership in the anar-
chist or Communist movements were not unusual for their eras, even if the 
speakers were not immigrants. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, in 1969, the Court 
found that advocacy of political violence can indeed be protected by the 
First Amendment.203 The immigration cases of the early and mid-Twentieth 
Century stand out in large part because of the free speech jurisprudence that 
came later. 
The factual context of AADC suggests a delicate political dance in-
volving the courts and the executive branch in which the Court may be sim-
ultaneously reluctant to get involved while gently warning the government 
to tread carefully so as not to force the judicial hand. Indeed, the executive 
branch has become more reluctant to take actions that the courts might not 
be willing to tolerate. This is demonstrated by the INS dropping the world 
communism ground of deportation so that the courts would not be asked to 
directly rule on an explicitly ideological ground of deportation. The Court, 
meanwhile, warns that it might rule differently in a future case in which the 
government action was more outrageous. This might be the case if an im-
migrant were subject to deportation because of political activities more fo-
cused on domestic American concerns where foreign policy interests ap-
peared less compelling and where there is no plausible connection with vio-
lence. In this way, the Second Circuit’s dicta regarding selective prosecution 
of John Lennon might still hold up, in the sense that a legendary popular 
musician might have made a more compelling champion of immigrant 
speech rights than members of a Palestinian militant group. 
This article will argue in Part V below that the factual context offers a 
way to minimize the clash that would otherwise result between free speech 
law and the AADC decision.204 To be clear, freedom of speech should not 
depend on how the government labels the speaker, on the topic on which the 
speaker chooses to express herself, nor on whether the speaker has a main-
stream popular following. AADC leaves immigrants with a precarious abil-
ity to express themselves freely. This is especially true for the millions of 
immigrants who are unlawfully present and can be deported on facially neu-
tral technical grounds. It does not, however, close the door entirely to im-
migrant free speech and leaves plenty of room for the Court to narrow the 
holding in a future case. 
                                                                                                                           
 202 Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 591–92. It is ironic that in Harisiades, the Court said that advocacy of 
political violence is forbidden because political change should be sought through the electoral process. 
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 203 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969). 
 204 See infra notes 255–285 and accompanying text. 
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IV. THE SPEAKER DISCRIMINATION DIMENSION 
Immigrants’ freedom of speech is far from secure under existing juris-
prudence. This article has demonstrated this through three examples. First, 
there is no Supreme Court case clearly holding that unlawfully present im-
migrants have First Amendment protection coupled with the assertion by 
the Department of Justice, at least in one case, that they do not.205 Second, 
election laws—affirmed in the Bluman decision—ban immigrants, except 
for legal permanent residents, from expressive activities that would other-
wise be considered core free speech.206 Third, in the AADC case the Su-
preme Court prevented immigrants from claiming selective prosecution as a 
defense against deportation targeting foreigners with militant political asso-
ciations.207 
In this Part, this article will bring into this discussion a new develop-
ment in free speech law that should lead the Court to bolster the constitu-
tional protection of immigrant speech: the doctrine of speaker discrimina-
tion. The United States Supreme Court first articulated the doctrine in 2010, 
in Citizens United v. FEC, and it was hotly contested between the majority 
and dissent in that 5-4 decision.208 Invoking this doctrine to bolster the 
speech rights of immigrants thus poses a challenge to the eight justices who 
remain on the Court. This article will argue that despite these challenges, 
Citizens United provides a powerful justification for protecting the free 
speech of all people in the United States, regardless of immigration status. 
There are perhaps two important reasons why the Supreme Court has 
yet to fully embrace immigrant free speech. The first is the ambivalence of 
both the judges and the general public about the place of immigrants in 
American society—particularly with regard to those who are here unlawful-
ly. This ambivalence finds expression in debates about whether immigrants 
can claim constitutional rights and in the legacy of the plenary power doc-
trine.209 The plenary power doctrine has long allowed immigration law to 
exist in a parallel universe, largely insulated from the civil liberties revolu-
tion in constitutional law in the Twentieth Century.210 The plenary power 
doctrine has receded significantly in cases involving the procedural due 
process rights of immigrants inside the United States.211 The Court, howev-
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 208 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 348, 422 (2010). 
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er, has yet to invalidate an immigration policy or decision based on substan-
tive constitutional rights.212 The AADC and Kleindienst decisions are lead-
ing examples of this trend. 
The second difficulty with applying the First Amendment to anti-
immigrant speech restrictions relates to limitations of traditional free speech 
doctrine. The source of immigrants’ difficulties obtaining First Amendment 
protection is their unique status, not the nature or content of what they 
might actually say. By contrast, free speech law has traditionally been con-
cerned with repression of disfavored opinions rather than with speech re-
strictions that target people based on their identity or status. As the Supreme 
Court said recently, “The guiding First Amendment principle that the gov-
ernment has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ide-
as, its subject matter, or its content applies with full force in a traditional 
public forum.”213 
As this quotation illustrates, free speech analysis has been focused on 
detecting content discrimination and in defining different types of fora.214 
Judicial scrutiny increases when speech restrictions apply in public fora and 
is more deferential in non-public fora or in a category known as a limited 
public forum.215 Likewise, scrutiny is heightened when government limits 
speech based on its content or viewpoint and is less strict when a regulation 
is content-neutral.216 
The trouble for immigrants is that speech restrictions that target non-
citizens are neither content-based nor forum-based; they are identity-
based.217 As a result, traditional free speech analysis may be partially blind 
to the kinds of speech restrictions to which immigrants are most vulnerable. 
That was the case for the restrictions on independent campaign expenditures 
in Bluman. That, as it turns out, was also the case with the independent ex-
penditure rule that the FEC sought to enforce against Citizens United for 
seeking to broadcast an anti-Hillary Clinton film during the 2008 presiden-
tial campaign. This speaker-identity gap was a central issue in Citizens 
                                                                                                                           
 212 See, e.g., Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2138 (2015) (refusing to apply heightened scrutiny to 
government’s rejection of visa application for husband of naturalized citizen). 
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United because the independent election expenditure rule at issue did not 
target groups based on their opinions.218 Instead, the rule restricted non-
profit organizations, corporations, and unions based on their institutional 
status—in other words, who they were, not what they wanted to say.219 The 
majority in Citizens United addressed this problem head on: “[T]he First 
Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the ideas that flow from 
each.”220 Elsewhere, the majority said, “Quite apart from the purpose or 
effect of regulating content, moreover, the Government may commit a con-
stitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers.”221 
This statement suggests that a speech restriction based on identity should 
trigger heightened scrutiny just like a content-based restriction, and strict 
scrutiny is what the Court applied in Citizens United.222 Unfortunately, Citi-
zens United is an unusually politicized decision. The subsequent debate 
about the decision raised questions about the majority’s commitment to the 
legal reasoning that it announced, whereas the division on the Court made 
the dissenters less willing to see potential areas of doctrinal agreement.223 
The premise that speaker discrimination is equivalent to content dis-
crimination proved contentious with the four dissenters. In fact, the four 
liberal dissenters cited the example of “foreigners” as a class of speakers 
that they thought could be targeted for speech restrictions in certain con-
texts. Justice Stevens wrote: 
The Government routinely places special restrictions on the 
speech rights of students, prisoners, members of the Armed Forc-
es, foreigners, and its own employees. When such restrictions are 
justified by a legitimate governmental interest, they do not neces-
sarily raise constitutional problems. In contrast to the blanket rule 
that the majority espouses, our cases recognize that the Govern-
ment’s interests may be more or less compelling with respect to dif-
ferent classes of speakers, and that the constitutional rights of cer-
tain categories of speakers, in certain contexts, “are not automati-
cally coextensive with the rights” that are normally accorded to 
members of our society.224 
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On its face, the dispute about speaker discrimination in Citizens United 
appears to invert the presumed sympathies of the liberal-conservative 
blocks on the Court. The majority expressed concern about “disadvantaged” 
members of society.225 Meanwhile, the four liberal dissenters expressed a 
willingness to tolerate speech restrictions that target “students, prison-
ers, members of the Armed Forces, foreigners, and [public] employees.”226 
These are groups not normally associated with the economic elite, including 
many people of color and many people who represent significant parts of 
the Democratic Party’s electoral constituency. 
The liberal justices in the dissent based their argument on confusion 
about First Amendment cases that focus on unique non-public fora.227 The 
Court has actually never said that students, soldiers, or even prisoners have 
less freedom of speech than other people as a general matter. Instead, the 
government has a legitimate need to exert greater control over their expres-
sive activities in certain non-public fora. For example, teenage high school 
students have freedom of speech, but “the constitutional rights of students in 
public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in 
other settings.”228 The same is true for soldiers’ free speech versus speech 
restrictions on military bases.229 Likewise, the Court has approved limita-
tions on speech for prison inmates inside the penal context because of the 
need to maintain order.230 The Court has, however, struck down limitations 
on prisoners’ rights to write letters to people outside prison.231 The dissent-
ers blur the line between speech restrictions that target certain types of peo-
ple and regulations that control speech because of the legitimate needs of 
certain types of government institutions. 
There are two exceptions, however, where the Court has approved 
speech restrictions based on speaker identity. One of these, arguably, is for 
public employees. In 1973, in Civil Service Commission v. National Associ-
ation of Letter Carriers, the United States Supreme Court upheld re-
strictions on certain election campaigning by federal employees. The Hatch 
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Act prohibited federal employees from taking “an active part in political 
management in political campaigns.”232 It prohibited public employees 
from many political activities, even on their own time and in a private ca-
pacity.233 Congress amended the Hatch Act, however, to permit most federal 
employees to participate in election campaigns in a private capacity.234 A 
recent Supreme Court case involving speech by public employees focused 
on whether the expression is part of their official duties.235 
The other exception is for non-citizen participation in election cam-
paigns as seen in the Bluman decision.236 It is noteworthy that both of these 
examples concern election-related speech. For the four justices who dis-
sented in Citizens United and in McCutcheon, there is a straightforward ra-
tionale. For these justices, the election context raises unique concerns about 
improper influence over government beyond quid pro quo corruption.237 As 
previously discussed in Part III, the majority rejected this broad anti-
corruption interest. It would thus seem harder for the four remaining justic-
es from the majority to explain why public employees and immigrants may 
be singled out for exclusion from participation in election campaigns. In 
McCutcheon, Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the plurality of the Supreme 
Court: “There is no right more basic in our democracy than the right to par-
ticipate in electing our political leaders.”238 As the Supreme Court jurispru-
dence stands now, private corporations seem to have a constitutional right to 
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 238 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1440–41. 
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a kind of expression that immigrants and public employees do not. It is dif-
ficult to understand why that should be. 
The partisan political dimensions are difficult to ignore. Citizens Unit-
ed is generally seen as favoring Republicans because it opens doors to elec-
tioneering by well-off interests that generally favor the more conservative 
party. By contrast, public employees and immigrants are generally seen as 
central to the Democratic Party coalition. This highlights a serious chal-
lenge for the four justices who supported Citizens United and McCutcheon. 
The immediate reaction to the Court’s new statement about speaker discrim-
ination offending the First Amendment was that the Court did not really 
mean it. In his dissent in Citizens United, Justice Stevens wrote, “While that 
glittering generality has rhetorical appeal, it is not a correct statement of the 
law.”239 The speaker discrimination part of Citizens United has been dis-
missed as being overly sweeping and faced skepticism about whether the 
Court will follow through.240 The Bluman decision is an example supporting 
this cynicism.241 In Bluman, the district court relied on the Citizens United 
dissenters to justify excluding immigrants from election-related expression 
that seems to bolster the idea that the legal argument advanced by the Citi-
zens United majority is not an authoritative statement of the law.242 
This article argues that the doubt about the speaker discrimination is 
also regrettable because what the Court said on this subject in Citizens 
United was right. Despite what Justice Stevens wrote, the speaker discrimi-
nation was not really new.243 Although the Court had never before clearly 
articulated the rule that speaker discrimination should trigger heightened 
scrutiny, it had recognized that speaker identity is an important part of 
speech. For example, in City of Ladue v. Gilleo, the United States Supreme 
Court, in 1994, recognized a First Amendment right to post political signs 
outside one’s home because doing so uniquely attaches the content of the 
sign to the identity of the speaker and in so doing changes the message.244 
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The Court has relied on a similar insight in recognizing a right to anony-
mous speech—that is, to deliberately separate the content of speech from 
the speaker’s identity.245 
Consider the implications of the connection between identity and mes-
sage in the context of speech by immigrants. When he announced his presi-
dential campaign, Donald Trump—who calls for all unlawful immigrants to 
be deported and for the construction of a “beautiful” wall on the Mexican 
border—suggested that Mexican immigrants are rapists.246 This statement 
was immediately and widely condemned, but most of those speakers were 
not themselves immigrants or Mexican. It is different for a Mexican immi-
grant to object to what Trump says than for a non-immigrant. Previous ju-
risprudence, such as City of Ladue, suggests that the First Amendment pro-
tects the ability of a speaker to connect message and identity in this way. 
Citizens United says that the government offends the First Amendment if it 
imposes speech restrictions against a certain type of speaker. Yet, as dis-
cussed in Part II, under current law and affirmed as constitutional in Blu-
man, this expression is actually prohibited and could lead to criminal prose-
cution or civil fines. That leaves immigrants constitutionally handicapped in 
attempting to combat speech with speech in the context of an election cam-
paign. 
Such identity-based speech restrictions do not only impact the would-
be immigrant speaker. They impact American citizens who would be inter-
ested in hearing what immigrants have to say, especially given the promi-
nence of immigration as an issue in public policy debates. The Court has 
recognized in the past that censorship impacts the audience as well as the 
would-be speaker, imperiling the public’s ability to hear the perspectives of 
those impacted by a particular public policy.247 That is why, for instance, 
prison inmates need to be able to communicate their complaints about pris-
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on conditions to the outside world.248 Justice Kennedy’s majority decision 
in Citizens United defended the speaker discrimination principle by ex-
pressing concern about marginalized segments of society: “By taking the 
right to speak from some and giving it to others, the Government deprives 
the disadvantaged person or class of the right to use speech to strive to es-
tablish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker’s voice.”249 Critical race 
theorists and feminist scholars similarly argued that a voice in national dis-
course connotes standing in society.250 In this way, there is a compelling, 
progressive, and inclusive principle at the heart of Citizens United. 
Justice Kennedy’s statement about protecting the right of the disadvan-
taged to have a voice in public debates eloquently explains what immigrant 
activists have been doing by putting themselves forward in public view in 
the effort to promote immigration reform. They are demonstrating their 
worth in society and implicitly demanding respect. They are also insisting 
on the opportunity to speak for themselves, rather than relying on others to 
talk about them. For these reasons, it should be a serious concern that exist-
ing law is so unsettled about whether they have a right to express them-
selves in this way. Citizens United’s articulation of the speaker discrimina-
tion principle offers a potentially powerful tool to repair this weakness in 
free speech jurisprudence and should be brought to bear wherever the gov-
ernment singles out immigrants to be excluded from public discourse. To do 
this, the justices who supported Citizens United need to be willing to show 
that the free speech principle they relied on in that case does not only apply 
to well-financed organizations. At the same time, the liberal justices who 
dissented should revisit their objections to a laudable premise of an admit-
tedly controversial decision. 
To resolve this problem, the Court’s unexplained per curiam decision 
in Bluman should be overruled. Although stare decisis carries considerable 
persuasive force, the Court has not followed it as rigidly in constitutional 
cases.251 An exception may also be made to stare decisis when a decision 
“was an abrupt and largely unexplained departure” from another recent 
precedent.252 Bluman, as a one line per curiam decision, contains no expla-
nation at all and appears inconsistent with Citizens United to such an extent 
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that it is cited by some to show that Citizens United lacks intellectual integ-
rity.253 The Roberts Court ought to be very concerned about the suggestion 
that a central pillar of one of its most controversial decisions cannot be tak-
en seriously as a precedent. This bolsters allegations that the majority of the 
Court simply favors conservative interests in the guise of free speech.254 
Such doubts are a threat to the very idea of constitutional law, transforming 
civil liberties cases into partisan exercises. 
VI. WRESTLING WITH PLENARY POWER 
If the Supreme Court were to clarify that all people in the United 
States have First Amendment protection, regardless of immigration status, 
and were also to correct its error in Bluman v. FEC, millions of immigrants 
would still face a major threat to their freedom of speech. Under a broad 
reading of Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (AADC), 
any of the 11 million immigrants who are unlawfully present might be tar-
geted for deportation if they engaged in dissident political activity. 
AADC has been cited recently as support for the general principle that 
the President has discretion to decide how to enforce immigration law, 
which is a justification for President Obama’s expanded use of deferred ac-
tion in immigration policy.255 Indeed, the decision includes text that is sup-
portive of wide discretion in deferred action policies.256 This discretion has 
led to increased focus on the presidency as a source of immigration policy 
even if Congress does not change the statutes. An influential article on ex-
ecutive power over immigration wrote: “[T]he inauguration of a new Presi-
dent can bring with it remarkable changes in immigration policy.”257 In 
AADC, however, prosecutorial discretion was used against the immigrants 
who claimed a selective prosecution defense. If this means then that there is 
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no First Amendment limit to prosecutorial discretion, then the above state-
ment might be quite ominous. It could mean that the election of a new Pres-
ident could bring dramatic new restrictions on immigrants’ ability to ex-
press themselves freely in the United States if it is true that immigrants have 
no selective enforcement defense against deportation based on the pretext of 
ideologically neutral violations of the immigration law.258 
A broad, straightforward reading of AADC leads to a number of dis-
turbing outcomes. Because it provides a sword that the government may 
wield over millions of people, the threat of deportation has the potential to 
silence an entire class based on who they are. This is in tension with the 
Court’s statements about speaker discrimination in Citizens United, in 
which the Court spoke about the importance of marginalized voices having 
standing to express themselves. It is not just free speech at stake. Could the 
government selectively take action against immigrants based on religion to 
deport as many Muslims on technical immigration violations as possible? If 
there is no First Amendment selective prosecution defense, then the answer 
seems to be yes. 
The Court in AADC noted that, even when allowed, selective prosecu-
tion is a difficult defense to prove.259 Were it not for this decision, however, 
selective prosecution might be somewhat easier to prove today than it was 
in the 1990s. Under Obama Administration policies, the DHS has published 
detailed guidance specifying who should be a priority for immigration en-
forcement.260 The result of these policies is that the vast majority of unlaw-
fully present immigrants are not priorities for enforcement unless they have 
a criminal record.261 Thus, if an outspoken immigrant activist were to be 
processed for deportation without having a criminal record or otherwise 
falling within one of the DHS’ official priorities, it would seem more likely 
that the deportation was triggered by her political activities. As yet, there is 
little reason to think that this is happening. If anything, the Obama Admin-
istration has utilized discretion to aid protesters who favor immigration re-
form.262 If a future administration took a more aggressive or hostile stance, 
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immigrants might have no protection. The executive branch could choose to 
deport those immigrant activists who it found most troublesome politically 
while leaving those immigrants who either keep their heads down or who 
seem less threatening to the government. Unauthorized immigrants would 
be unable to use speech to establish their worth and standing in society, as 
Citizens United says that all speakers should be able to do. 
There is a way to read AADC, however, so as to avoid this clash with 
free speech principles—though perhaps not the most evident reading from 
the text. Nevertheless, there are notes of caution in the AADC decision. The 
first was the fact that the government itself withdrew the Communism 
ground for deportation, and thus avoided re-testing the constitutionality of 
explicitly ideological grounds for removal.263 The second was that the Court 
left the door open for a selective prosecution case that would be “outra-
geous” enough to prevail.264 This open door to a future selective prosecu-
tion claim suggests that the Court does not entirely reject the relevance of 
First Amendment concerns in the deportation context. 
It is plausible that the holding of AADC should be limited to its rela-
tively unusual facts, in which the deported immigrants were guilty of seri-
ous offenses that could alternatively have been prosecuted criminally. The 
immigrants in that case were accused of membership in a terrorist organiza-
tion.265 The government explained the basis for this allegation in its brief to 
the Supreme Court.266 The PFLP had been responsible for multiple bloody 
attacks around the world.267 An FBI investigation identified one of the re-
spondents through confidential sources during security preparations for the 
1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games that suggested that he was “organizing 
fundraising events on behalf of the PFLP at which money was solicited for 
the stated purpose of supporting the organization’s ‘fighters.’”268 The other 
seven respondents were accused of supporting this fundraising activity.269 
Today, this conduct could constitute the crime of providing material 
support to a terrorist organization under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996.270 When there is probable cause to sustain a 
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criminal charge, prosecutors have wide discretion whether to actually pros-
ecute and how to do so, taking into account resource concerns, equities of a 
particular case, and the public interest.271 If federal authorities believe that 
an immigrant may be guilty of a criminal terrorism offense and also a tech-
nical immigration violation, they would face an important decision. A crim-
inal prosecution would allow for long imprisonment, eliminating a potential 
threat, but would also entitle the defendant to extensive trial rights. In addi-
tion to meeting a high burden of proof, the government might have to pro-
duce sensitive evidence and subject sensitive witnesses to cross-
examination. By contrast, deporting the person on technical immigration 
law grounds would probably be more efficient and would not require the 
government to reveal its intelligence sources. Though it would remove a 
person from U.S. territory, he or she might remain free to act from abroad—
unless a foreign government would take action to detain him or her. These 
are precisely the kinds of sensitive tactical decisions that are entrusted to 
executive discretion. 
A wrinkle here is that the material support crime was not yet on the 
books in the 1980s when the events leading to the AADC case transpired. 
Thus, criminal prosecution may not have been an option in this case. But 
this is not actually the point. So long as the conduct that led to selective en-
forcement could be constitutionally criminalized, then deportation could not 
be said to impair protected free speech. The Government made this argu-
ment to the Supreme Court, by which time the material support crime had 
been enacted: “the activities that allegedly would be ‘chilled’ by the depor-
tation proceedings—the provision of material support to the PFLP—are 
currently the subject of civil and criminal prohibitions under other federal 
laws.”272 
In 2010, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the United States Su-
preme Court affirmed this view, finding that the material support ban does 
not violate the First Amendment.273 Because providing material support for 
terrorist organizations is not constitutionally protected speech, a selective 
prosecution defense based on engaging in such activity must fail.274 This 
rationale explains the holding in AADC and would have far narrower impli-
cations for immigrant political activism generally. 
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Reading AADC as a case about conduct that never was protected by 
the First Amendment puts the selective prosecution question in a new light. 
Concededly, parts of AADC indicate that there is no First Amendment selec-
tive prosecution defense against deportation. The Court’s penultimate sum-
mary of its holding at the end of the decision is narrower: “When an alien’s 
continuing presence in this country is in violation of the immigration laws, 
the Government does not offend the Constitution by deporting him for the 
additional reason that it believes him to be a member of an organization that 
supports terrorist activity.”275 This leaves open the possibility that were the 
government to selectively target immigrants for deportation because of po-
litical activities that are protected by the First Amendment—say, someone 
like John Lennon, as discussed in Part III—then it might be a case of “dis-
crimination so outrageous” that the government’s normal plenary power 
may be overcome.276 
The difficulty in deciding how broadly to read AADC reflects a wider 
problem in immigration law, evident also in older cases like Kleindienst.277 
Both cases involved an apparent clash between a fundamental right and a 
government decision to act against a particular non-citizen. In both cases, 
the Court held in favor of the government’s plenary power while, at the 
same time, holding the door open for a different conclusion in an undefined 
future case. This leaves unclear whether substantive decisions about immi-
gration must bend to accommodate fundamental rights like freedom of 
speech and, if so, when.278 Is plenary power over immigration so strong that 
it permits actions by the government that otherwise would clearly violate 
the Constitution? After AADC, the Court said that plenary power is subject 
to “important constitutional limitations” but other than procedural due pro-
cess it is not entirely clear what these limitations might be.279 The current 
situation can be summarized by the following: “Slowly chipping away at 
the plenary power doctrine, the Supreme Court has increasingly protected 
the procedural due process rights of noncitizens facing removal from the 
country. Nevertheless, the core of the doctrine [of plenary power] continues 
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to protect the substantive immigration judgments of Congress from judicial 
review.”280 
The Court’s reluctance to review substantive immigration decisions 
was again on display in 2015 in Kerry v. Din, where the United States Su-
preme Court turned away a claim by a U.S. citizen that the government had 
arbitrarily infringed her fundamental rights by denying a visa to her 
spouse.281 The Court splintered in its attempt to provide a rationale for this 
decision, suggesting considerable confusion about where the doctrine 
stands. Din makes clear that there are at least four justices who think that 
fundamental rights— in this case, the right to marriage— should limit ple-
nary power.282 The best view appears to be that the Court is moving in half 
steps, assessing case by case whether to expand constitutional scrutiny over 
immigration.283 The Court’s incremental approach has been helped by the 
government pulling back from positions that would have forced a more di-
rect conflict— such as dropping the Communism ground for deportation in 
AADC. 
Much depends on whether the government maintains the restraint that 
it has exercised vis-à-vis immigrant activists. If it does not, the Court will 
once again face a choice about applying substantive constitutional limits on 
immigration control. Free speech is an ideal first case for the Court to apply 
such a limit. First, the claim here would be only that all people inside the 
United States have freedom of speech and thus there would be no conflict 
with the holdings of Kleindienst or Din, which concerned people seeking 
visas to enter the country. Second, because most immigration enforcement 
is not based on political ideology, imposing a First Amendment limitation 
on plenary power would not radically change the practice of immigration 
law.284 Third, preventing the government from picking and choosing who 
may speak is important for our democracy for reasons articulated by Justice 
Kennedy in the Citizens United decision. Indeed, there may be something 
special about the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, which allow 
them to overcome plenary power even when other fundamental rights 
claims fail.285 
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CONCLUSION 
Securing the constitutional right of all immigrants to speak freely in 
the United States is increasingly urgent for two reasons. First, there has 
been a flourishing of immigrant-led activism in support of immigration re-
form. Second, the 2016 presidential campaign has featured anti-immigration 
positions that are unusually hostile by recent standards of mainstream poli-
tics. These two trends have a high potential for collision in ways that may 
put immigrant free speech rights under the microscope. Even if Donald 
Trump is not elected president, an immigrant may run afoul of election law 
for engaging even in fairly small expressive activities opposed to his candi-
dacy. If he or any similarly anti-immigrant candidate were to be elected, 
immigrant activists could find themselves targeted for deportation. Even the 
Obama Justice Department has argued that immigrants who entered the 
country illegally can claim no protection of the First Amendment. 
This situation exists because the Supreme Court through the years has 
sent ambivalent and conflicting signals about immigrant free speech rights. 
It has never quite said that immigrants do not all have freedom of speech. It 
has, however, never unequivocally said that they all do. Additionally, it has 
issued recent decisions that affirm government power to limit immigrant 
speech, either in the election campaign context or in terms of selective en-
forcement of immigration law. To a great extent, a muddled situation has 
developed because the executive branch has shown a certain amount of re-
straint in how it has used its powers, so that recent cases have not asked the 
Court to apply McCarthy era or early Twentieth Century case law that— 
while never overruled—appears anachronistic in light of more recent devel-
opments in free speech jurisprudence and immigration law. 
A threat to the freedom of speech of a class of people because of who 
they are does not fit neatly in the content-focused analysis that has been 
traditionally used in free speech cases. Instead, the speaker discrimination 
doctrine articulated in Citizens United appears both to describe the problem 
and to capture the idea that immigrant activists are sending a valuable mes-
sage by putting their immigration status front and center in their activism. 
Speaker identity changes speech in powerful ways, which is why it is dan-
gerous to allow the government to silence certain speakers based on who 
they are. The Court should recognize that immigrant speech is important 
enough to be protected by the First Amendment, both for immigrants in the 
United States and for American citizens who may benefit from hearing what 
they have to say. 
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The trouble is that presidential discretion may be used differently as 
soon as a new president is inaugurated. A situation could easily arise in 
which, even if the government does not overtly act, a lawyer may need to 
warn immigrant activists that they are at risk and should consider self-
censorship. In order to ensure that the all people in the United States enjoy 
free speech protection, the Supreme Court needs to do three things. First, 
the Court should clarify that the statement in Bridges that the First Amend-
ment covers non-citizens applies regardless of whether someone is in the 
country lawfully. This principle, combined with the speaker discrimination 
doctrine drawn from Citizens United and other cases, is the foundation for 
the next necessary steps. The second step is for the Court to reconsider 
Bluman, which is in tension both with the speaker discrimination doctrine 
and the Court’s rejection of generalized fears of corruption through election 
expenditures. Finally, the Court needs to clarify the holding of AADC, so as 
to make clear that selective prosecution can be used as a defense against 
deportation if the punished speech would be protected under the First 
Amendment. This is not an easy wish list. Right now immigrant free speech 
is quite precarious constitutionally. This is cause for concern, and if a new 
President uses prosecutorial discretion aggressively against immigrants who 
are currently sheltered by the Obama Administration, it may become a seri-
ous crisis. 
 
  
 
